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Abstract
Consider sources that supply sensitive data to an aggregator. Standard encryption only hides the
data from eavesdroppers, but using specialized encryption one can hope to hide the data (to the
extent possible) from the aggregator itself. For flexibility and security, we envision schemes that
allow sources to supply encrypted data, such that at any point a dynamically-chosen subset of
sources can allow an agreed-upon joint function of their data to be computed by the aggregator. A
primitive called multi-input functional encryption (MIFE), due to Goldwasser et al. (EUROCRYPT
2014), comes close, but has two main limitations:
it requires trust in a third party, who is able to decrypt all the data, and
it requires function arity to be fixed at setup time and to be equal to the number of parties.
To drop these limitations, we introduce a new notion of ad hoc MIFE. In our setting, each source
generates its own public key and issues individual, function-specific secret keys to an aggregator. For
successful decryption, an aggregator must obtain a separate key from each source whose ciphertext
is being computed upon. The aggregator could obtain multiple such secret-keys from a user
corresponding to functions of varying arity. For this primitive, we obtain the following results:
We show that standard MIFE for general functions can be bootstrapped to ad hoc MIFE for
free, i.e. without making any additional assumption.
We provide a direct construction of ad hoc MIFE for the inner product functionality based on
the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption. This yields the first construction of this natural
primitive based on a standard assumption.
At a technical level, our results are obtained by combining standard MIFE schemes and two-round
secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols in novel ways highlighting an interesting interplay
between MIFE and two-round MPC.
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1 Introduction
In modern society, there is an inherent need for external entities to aggregate and analyze
sensitive data from a variety of sources. A few prominent examples are:
To track diseases, disease control centers would like hospital patients’ medical information.
To determine medication efficacy for a given subpopulation, pharmaceutical companies
would like patients’ genomic information.
To provide targeted advertising to consumers, corporations would like buyers’ demographic
information.
However, this release of sensitive data to external entities is unsettling, as these entities must
now be trusted to preserve the confidentiality of the released data. We would like to avoid
the need for this trust and believe that specialized encryption schemes will be an important
tool for doing so. At a high level, we would like schemes that allow users to encrypt their
data before transferring them to an external entity, such that only certain user-specified
joint functions of the data are revealed to the entity holding it. We would like this security
guarantee to be supported in a flexible way, allowing joint functions of the data to be revealed
by any dynamically-chosen subset of users that permit it.
A primitive that comes close, due to Goldwasser et al. [45], is multi-input functional
encryption (MIFE). To understand MIFE, we first recall the simpler notion of functional
encryption (FE) [20]. Just as in traditional encryption, in functional encryption ciphertexts
can be generated with an encryption key. However, each decryption key is associated with
a function f , and decryption of an encryption of m using this key results in not m but
f(m). Intuitively, security requires that nothing more than f(m) can be learned from the
encryption of m and the decryption key for f . In MIFE, decryption keys allow computing
joint functions of (possibly) different plaintexts underlying multiple ciphertexts. That is,
decryption takes a key for a function f and ciphertexts c1, . . . cn encrypting m1, . . . ,mn, and
outputs f(m1, . . . ,mn).
However, MIFE has an important drawback: encryption and decryption keys are generated
via a global setup procedure run by an external entity usually called the key authority. This
begs the question of whether putting trust in the key authority is really better than putting
trust in the external entities that aggregate and analyze the data in the first place. A similar
point was made by Rogaway about identity-based encryption (IBE) [60]. Indeed, removing
this in the case of IBE (and other settings) has been an active area of investigation, e.g.
see [18, 49, 35]. We contend that for MIFE (and indeed FE) the concern is heightened, as the
authority can not only decrypt all the data but is also the one in charge of which functions of
the data other external entities can compute. Hence, MIFE does not allow users to enforce
their own privacy policies.
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Additionally, from a flexibility standpoint, MIFE is limited in that it fixes the number of
senders and function arity at setup time. This does not support a dynamic setting in which
users can join or leave. Progress on removing this limitation was made by Badrinarayanan et
al. [10], who introduced a notion of MIFE for unbounded arity functions. However, their
notion does not allow any subset of users to reveal a joint function of their data to an external
entity without coordination from all other users, and moreover relies on strong “knowledge
type” assumptions. Another closely related notion to ours is that of decentralized multi-client
FE, recently introduced by Chotard et al. [27]. While this work shares some of the high
level motivation of the present work, the two primitives are very different. Please see Section
1.3.3 for a comparison.
1.1 Our Notion: Ad Hoc MIFE
To address the above limitations, we introduce a new notion of ad hoc MIFE. In ad hoc MIFE,
each source (aka. sender or user) will run a local setup procedure to generate some public
parameters as well as a private encryption key. (One can also consider a public-key setting,
but this puts limits on achievable security and we do not do so in this work.1) Each source
publishes their public parameters and encrypts using their private key. These ciphertexts can
be sent to an aggregator (aka. decryptor). Furthermore, using their private keys, sources can
issue “partial decryption keys” to an aggregator. Each partial decryption key is associated
with an `-ary function f for some ` and is generated using the public keys of ` − 1 other
(dynamically chosen) sources. If these other ` − 1 sources also issue “matching” partial
decryption keys for f to this aggregator, it can decrypt any ` ciphertexts c1, . . . , c`, each
produced by the corresponding source, to f(m1, . . . ,m`) where m1, . . . ,m` are the plaintexts.
One can also consider restricted versions of the above notion, that bound the number of
users or fix ` (or both). In particular, taking the number of users equal to ` gives a version
of MIFE that still drops the global setup procedure but lacks the dynamic aspect. Finally,
we also consider the restricted notion of bounded ad hoc MIFE, where we place a bound on
the number of “partial decryption keys” a user is allowed to issue. Intuitively, for security,
we require that an aggregator learns only the functions of the data for which it has been
given all of the matching partial decryption keys.
Note that while we assume each source can obtain the authentic public parameters of
other sources with whom it wants to allow joint functions of the data to be computed, there
is no other prior coordination between users (this is one of the main advantages of our notion
over [27]). In particular, there is no external entity that generates public parameters or keys.
In some of our constructions, we work in the common reference string (CRS) model, but
note that this is still much weaker than having an authority who can decrypt all the data.
1.2 Our Results
Our results may be summarized as follows:
Feasibility result for general functions: First, we show that standard MIFE for general
functions can be bootstrapped to ad hoc MIFE for general functions for free. More
specifically, we show that ad hoc MIFE for any functionality is implied by standard MIFE
for that functionality combined in a novel way with general FE and a special type of
two-round secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol. The latter two are implied by
standard MIFE for general functions.
1 In more detail, in the public-key setting a decryptor could launch an attack where it replaces one user’s
input with various values to determine information about the input of another user.
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Table 1 Our new constructions of ad hoc MIFE.
Functionality Assumptions Security CRS? Section
General std. MIFE Semi-honest No 4
General std. MIFE Malicious Yes 4
Inner Product LWE Semi-honest Yes 5
Inner Product LWE Malicious Yes 5
Inner Product (Bounded) DDH, LWE, DCR Semi-honest No 5
Inner Product (Bounded) DDH, LWE, DCR Malicious Yes 5
While very general, the result leaves open the goal of obtaining ad hoc MIFE under
standard assumptions. In general, this is challenging as standard MIFE is already known
to be equivalent to indistinguishability obfuscation [33, 8, 17], which is a central open
problem in cryptography. In fact, some negative evidence about the hardness of obtaining
such constructions has also been provided [37, 38]. Thus, with the goal of moving towards
using standard assumptions, we consider the task of ad hoc MIFE for special but natural
functionalities.
Constructions for Inner Products from Standard Assumptions: We provide a construction
of ad hoc MIFE for the inner product functionality from standard assumptions, namely
LWE.2 Introduced by Abdalla et al. [1] in the single-input setting, this functionality has
applications in data mining and information retrieval. Our result is obtained via a general
paradigm for constructing ad-hoc MIFE schemes from standard MIFE schemes satisfying
certain natural properties; or, what we call “ad hoc friendly” standard MIFE schemes.
We show that certain constructions of standard MIFE scheme for inner products from
the literature [3, 2] based on standard assumptions (DDH, LWE, or DCR) already satisfy
these properties. Additionally, we use a specific two-round MPC protocol [57] that can
also be obtained via LWE. We note that by using a two-round MPC protocol from any
two-round OT protocol [41, 42, 15] here, we also obtain results for the case of bounded ad
hoc MIFE for inner products – namely, we get bounded ad hoc MIFE for inner products
from DDH, LWE and DCR as well.3 We remark that since our general construction (first
result) already relies on general MIFE for circuits, there is no advantage to mitigating
assumptions for the two-round MPC protocol in that setting.
We emphasize that our transformation is general. Thus, our transformation can be used
to upgrade the security of any “ad hoc friendly” standard MIFE for a given functionality
to ad hoc MIFE for the same functionality. This result might also be useful in obtaining
future constructions of ad hoc MIFE. Furthermore, the modularity of this approach allows
for simplifications in our constructions.
We tabulate our results in Table 1 and provide explanation of which MPC protocol is needed
for each of the results in Section 1.3.
2 We stress that this functionality outputs inner products in the clear and is therefore a different type of
functionality than that of Katz et al. in [54], which tests if an inner product is zero or not.
3 Note that semi-honest constructions of two-round OT are known under each of these assumptions.
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1.3 Technical Overview
In this section, we describe at a high level the challenges involved in constructing ad hoc
MIFE and our techniques for overcoming them.
1.3.1 Ad Hoc MIFE for Arbitrary Functions.
Standard MIFE and ad hoc MIFE can be seen as secure multiparty computation (MPC)
protocols with a particular allowable interaction pattern and certain additional reuse cap-
abilities.4 To begin, let us consider the interaction pattern followed by standard MIFE.
In standard MIFE, there is a trusted global setup which receives as input the number of
parties `, and outputs a public key and a set of ` encryption keys. Additionally, global setup
on input a function f generates the decryption key DKf . Of these, the public parameters
are broadcast to all users and encryption key EKi is provided to encryptor i, for i ∈ [`].
The encryptors then compute their ciphertexts CT(mi) and send these to the aggregator
who may now compute the function output f(m1 . . . ,m`) using the decryption/function key
DKf . Finally, the system supports arbitrary number of decryption keys and ciphertexts. As
explained in Section 1.1, in ad hoc MIFE, we seek to eliminate the trusted global procedure
as well as support dynamic choice of parties involved in any function computation.
1.3.1.1 Challenges Involved
An approach to eliminating the trusted setup from standard MIFE is to use MPC to
replace the global setup. However, naively computing the setup procedure using MPC
would introduce interaction between the parties, which the syntax of MIFE does not allow.
Moreover, this (interactive) procedure would need to be rerun each time a function key is
required to be generated. Using two round MPC, one may hope to overcome the barrier of
interaction using the following natural idea: let parties perform a two-round MPC to perform
the setup and key generation for a standard MIFE. In more detail, parties in the first round
could publish as their public parameters the first round MPC messages with their secret
randomness as input. Given the first round messages, parties could send the second round
MPC message to the aggregator, who could use it to compute the function key. However,
this approach does not suffice since:
1. MIFE requires that the public parameters be published only once whereas the above
template requires publishing fresh public parameters for each function key.
2. Even more fundamentally, the above approach precludes users from being able to encrypt,
as their encryption keys are not available given just the first round MPC message.
In particular, the above approach does not decouple ciphertexts and functions as in traditional
MIFE, which leads to the limitation that an evaluator cannot evaluate the same function on
multiple inputs chosen by the parties, nor evaluate other functions on the same set of inputs.
Additionally, the problem is made challenging by the fact that in MIFE an aggregator might
obtain arbitrary number of secret keys and an encryptor might generate arbitrary number of
ciphertexts.
4 Recall that MPC allows a set of parties to compute a joint function of their inputs without revealing
anything else but in general allows these parties to freely interact (although restrictions may apply in
special cases).
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1.3.1.2 Overcoming the first barrier: Function re-runnable two-round MPC
In order to mitigate the first problem above, we require that the first round MPC message
be sent only once, and reused for all subsequent second round messages thus providing
re-usability/re-runnability for secret key generation. Towards achieving this re-usability, an
idea is to use function rerunnable two-round MPC protocols, where the same first round
message can be reused for multiple functions in the second round. As we will see, certain
existing two-round MPC protocols satisfy this requirement (see later), but this still does not
solve the problem. This is because in adhoc MIFE, we additionally need that for the MPC
protocol, the function or even its arity are not known at the time the first round message
is sent. We overcome this hurdle by using “function delayed” protocols, which permit the
choice of function to be delayed to the second round of the protocol. Together, these special
protocols may be used to overcome the first barrier outlined above.
1.3.1.3 Overcoming the second barrier: Delaying Encryption
In order to overcome the second barrier, we allow the encryptor to delay the encryption
process until the encryption keys are known (in similar spirit as [13, 30]). In more detail,
we will have each source independently run the setup algorithm of a single input FE scheme,
denoted as FE and compute the first round message of an MPC protocol using the FE master
key as input. This message is published as part of the public key and made available to all
other sources. Additionally, each source provides an encryption of its input mi using the
algorithm FE.Encrypt.
The sources may choose the function f to be computed and the group that will participate
in the computation dynamically. At this point, each source independently executes the
partial key generation algorithm as follows: it generates the second round message of an MPC
protocol for a suitable f dependent functionality GenKeysf and sends this to the aggregator.
Intuitively, the functionality GenKeysf has the circuit f hard-coded in it, and enables the
aggregator to compute the output.
However, recall that the inputs to the GenKeys functionality are not the messages on which
the computation must be performed, but rather the FE master keys generated independently
by each player. To proceed, the functionality instead uses the FE master keys to compute
FE function keys for a re-encryption procedure, which translates FE ciphertexts to MIFE
ciphertexts for a freshly generated (standard) MIFE scheme. During this time, the arity of
the function f is known, so a suitable standard MIFE scheme may be instantiated. It further
outputs an MIFE function key for the function f .
We are almost done: GenKeysf runs the setup procedure for a suitable fixed arity standard
MIFE scheme, computes FE function keys for each party for the re-encryption functionality,
computes the MIFE function key for f and outputs these. The aggregator uses the FE keys
together with the FE ciphertexts provided by each encryptor to translate FE.Enc(mi) to
ci = MIFE.Enc(mi) and then runs the MIFE decryption procedure to obtain f(m1, . . . ,m`).
Put together, we resolved all difficulties by carefully nesting a a multi-input FE scheme
MIFE, within the single input FE scheme FE, which in turn is nested within a re-runnable
two-round MPC protocol MPC.
One final problem remains: the adversary could get some partial information from an
“incomplete” set of partial decryption keys for some function. This is because standard MPC
makes no guarantee when an honest party does not send their final message. We solve this
problem by masking the output of MPC by pseudorandom values generated for each party.
The partial decryption keys contains the respective user’s pseudorandom masks so that only
a complete set of user keys can be used to unmask the output.
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While security appears to follow intuitively from the security of MPC, FE and MIFE, the
proof must contend with several technical hurdles as we are forced to deal with indistin-
guishability style security of FE, MIFE (simulation security for these primitives is known
to be impossible [20, 6]). We argue security via a careful sequence of hybrids, please see
Section 4 for details.
1.3.1.4 Instantiating MPC
We now discuss possible instantiations of MPC to fit the above template. Depending on the
properties of the underlying two-round MPC protocol, we obtain different properties of the
resulting ad hoc MIFE scheme. In both the semi-honest (passive decryptor) and the malicious
(active decryptor) settings, the most general function-rerunnable, two-round MPC protocols
without CRS can be constructed [32, 48] from indistinguishability obfuscation [33], which
itself can be constructed from multi-input functional encryption [8]. Furthermore, as already
noted in [40], we remark that in the semi-honest setting the construction of [32] can actually
be instantiated in the plain model. This is based on the observation that the CRS in the
protocol of [32] was only needed for the computation in the second round. Thus semi-honest
parties could obtain a CRS by just performing a one-round coin flipping in the first round.
This yields our first result: we get ad hoc MIFE for general functions from standard MIFE for
general functions. In the semi-honest setting, the ad hoc MIFE construction is in the plain
model. On the other hand, in the malicious setting, these protocols work in the common
reference string (CRS) model.
Alternatively, function-rerunnable two-round MPC in the common reference string (CRS)
model can be constructed [28, 57, 24, 59] from learning-with-errors (LWE). This yields ad hoc
MIFE from LWE and standard MIFE in the CRS model (either semi-honest or malicious).
While bounded two-round MPC in the CRS model can be constructed from bilinear maps [41]
and even two-round oblivious transfer [15, 42, 39] or information theoretically [9, 36], these
constructions are not function-rerunnable so do not suffice for our general construction. We
note that these constructions would suffice for obtaining bounded ad hoc MIFE, where a
user issues only a bounded number of partial decryption keys and maintains state across key
issues. However, since in our general result we anyway require the minimum assumption of
FE/MIFE, instantiating MPC from weaker assumptions does not yield any benefits, and we
do not discuss this further. Our results are highlighted in Table 1.
1.3.2 Ad Hoc MIFE for Inner Products.
While our construction of ad hoc MIFE above applies to arbitrary functionalities, it requires
use of standard MIFE for general functions. Unfortunately, as noted above, standard
MIFE implies indistinguishability obfuscation. Hence, there is limited hope of basing it
on standard assumptions. Additionally, our general transformation uses an FE scheme
for a potentially complicated re-encryption functionality and also requires general-purpose,
function-rerunnable two-round MPC for computing a complex functionality. These aspects
limit the practical applicability of our general result.
Next, we describe a paradigm for constructing ad-hoc MIFE schemes from standard MIFE
schemes that are “ad hoc friendly” and a (hopefully simple) two-round MPC protocol. This
paradigm significantly simplifies our general construction and provides a way for basing it on
standard assumptions. We then show that the standard MIFE scheme for inner products
[3, 2], which may be based on DDH, LWE or DCR, is ad hoc friendly and the corresponding
two-round MPC protocol is only required to compute inner-products, thus obtaining an
efficient ad hoc MIFE scheme for inner products.
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More formally, in the inner product functionality a decryption key corresponds to a
concatenated vector y = (y1 ‖ · · · ‖ yn) where yi ∈ Zmq , and a ciphertext encrypts a vector
xi ∈ Zmq . The desired result of decryption is
∑n
i=1〈xi,yi〉. Importantly, the decryptor should
not learn the partial sums 〈xi,yi〉. The inner product functionality has applications in data
mining and information retrieval [1, 3]. We use constructions of standard MIFE for inner
product by [3, 2].
Below, we start by summarizing our notion of “ad hoc freindliness,” which (as we see
later) is indeed satisfied by the above mentioned standard MIFE for inner product by [3, 2].
Our notion of ad hoc friendliness may be summarized as follows:
1. Decentralized Setup. The MIFE.Setup algorithm of the MIFE is decentralized in the sense
that:
a. The encryption keys EKi for i ∈ [n] corresponding to party i may be generated
independently of the encryption keys of the remaining parties [n] \ i.
b. The master secret key MSK can be decomposed into n components {MSKi}i∈[n]. The
partial MSKi corresponding to party i may be generated locally by party i, without
any interaction or shared state with the remaining parties.
2. Local Encryption. The encryption algorithm only takes its encryption key and message
as input and does not depend on the number of parties or their public parameters.
3. Piecewise Master Secret Key. The master secret in standard MIFE
MSK = {MSK1, . . . ,MSKn}, if restricted to some subset S ⊆ [n] with |S| = `, has the
same distribution as a master secret generated for functions of arity `.
We show that a standard MIFE with the above properties can be upgraded to ad hoc
MIFE described above in a more direct manner than our generic transformation from standard
MIFE to ad hoc MIFE. To see this, recall that one of the key challenges in ad hoc MIFE
is that the encryptor must encrypt her messages without knowing the encryption key for
the underlying standard MIFE. This is because the members or size of the group that will
participate in the computation are chosen dynamically later.
To handle this, we used single input FE to encrypt messages and the MPC protocol for
functionality GenKeys to sample an MIFE scheme and then translate the FE ciphertexts to
MIFE ciphertexts. In the current setting however, due to properties (1) and (2) above, the
encryption key of each party can be generated locally and each party can directly perform
MIFE encryption locally. Since the re-encryption functionality involves computing a PRF
and computing an MIFE encryption, the savings accrued by skipping this step are significant.
We will still require MPC to compute the MIFE function key, but no longer need the MPC
functionality to sample the master secret key, so for simple functionalities this protocol may
be much leaner than our general MPC protocol. For instance, in the case of inner products,
we show that the required MPC protocol only needs to support inner product computations.
While the structural requirements described above may seem very strong, as mentioned
earlier, we show that these requirements are enjoyed by the MIFE for inner products recently
constructed by Abdalla et al. [2] and can be used to instantiate our compiler providing a
very simple and efficient ad hoc MIFE for inner products. Please see Section 5 for details.
1.3.2.1 Instantiating MPC
As discussed for the case of our generic construction, we use two-round MPC protocols to
obtain ad hoc MIFE for inner products. Specifically, since function-rerunnable two-round
MPC in the common reference string (CRS) model can be constructed [28, 57, 24, 59] from
learning-with-errors (LWE), we immediately get ad hoc MIFE from LWE. This result can
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be upgraded to the malicious setting at the additional cost of NIZKs. On the other hand,
construction of two-round MPC from two-round oblivious transfer [15, 42, 39], yields bounded
ad hoc MIFE for inner products under DDH, LWE or DCR, albeit with the requirement that
the sources maintain state across key issues. One nice feature of these schemes is that they
work without the need for a CRS in the semi-honest setting and upgrade to the malicious
setting can be made just using CRS. Please see Section 5 for details.
Our results are highlighted in Table 1.
1.3.3 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the prior work in this area. Here, we focus on two related primitives,
decentralized multi-client FE and and non-interactive MPC. Further related work on FE,
MIFE, MPC and multi-authority FE can be found in Appendix A.
1.3.3.1 Decentralized Multi-Client Functional Encryption
Very recently, Chotard et al [27] proposed the notion of decentralized multi-client functional
encryption (D-MCFE). While the motivation for the two works is similar in removing the
common key authority, our notion of adhoc MIFE is significantly more general in that:
1. MCFE itself is more restricted than MIFE, since only CTs with the same labels can be
combined. In MIFE there is no such restriction. MIFE for circuits captures MCFE for
circuits (by checking for equal labels within the MIFE functionality) but not vice versa.
2. Crucially, the setup algorithm in D-MCFE is a protocol that is run between multiple
senders, requiring interaction, whereas our setup algorithm is run independently by each
source and is thus non-interactive. Note that developing a non-interactive solution is one
of the main motivations of this work.
3. The work of Chotard et al [27] only provides a construction for inner products. We
provide a general construction as well as one for inner products. Since our model is
stronger, our inner product construction is significantly more involved than theirs.
4. Decentralized MCFE lacks the dynamic aspect, which is one of the main contributions of
our work. We permit the function arity and participating parties to be chosen dynamically
– a feature no other construction supports (to the best of our knowledge).
Non-Interactive MPC
Another related notion is that of non-interactive MPC (NI-MPC), where a group of asyn-
chronous parties may evaluate a function over their inputs by sending a single message to
an evaluator who computes the output [51]. While they appear superficially similar, we
note that the model of ad hoc MIFE is fundamentally different from NI-MPC since, unlike
NI-MPC, it separates inputs and functions, i.e. provides ciphertexts and function keys which
allows reusing an input/ciphertext with many different functions, and a function with many
different inputs. On the other hand, NI-MPC does not support function reusability at all,
and only a very restricted version of input re-usability, namely where only ciphertexts in the
same “session” may be combined. The function arity in NI-MPC is also fixed, unlike ad hoc
MIFE.
2 Preliminaries
Due to space constraints, the preliminaries can be found in Appendix B.
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3 Ad hoc Multi-Input Functional Encryption
We are now ready to define our new notion of ad hoc multi-input functional encryption
(MIFE). For simplicity, we define ad hoc MIFE in the private-key setting only. We leave the
study of ad hoc MIFE in the public-key setting for future work.
3.1 Syntax and Correctness
An ad hoc multi-input functional encryption scheme aMIFE for a message space {Mκ}κ∈N
and a functionality {Fκ}κ∈N, where for each κ ∈ N, each f ∈ Fκ is a (description of a)
function on (Mκ)` for some ` (which may depend on f), is given by a set of algorithms with
the following syntax:
aMIFE.Setup(1κ): A PPT algorithm taking the security parameter κ, and outputting the
master secret key MSK and the public parameters PP.
aMIFE.KeyGen(i,MSKi, (PP1, · · · ,PP`), f): A PT algorithm taking an index i ∈ [`], a
master secret key MSKi corresponding to PPi, a set of public parameters PP1, · · · ,PP`, a
function f ∈ Fκ of arity `, and outputting a corresponding partial decryption key PDKi,f .
aMIFE.Enc(MSK,x): A PPT algorithm taking a master secret key MSK and a message
x ∈Mκ, and outputting a ciphertext c.
aMIFE.Dec((PDK1,f , . . . ,PDK`,f ), (c1, . . . , c`)): A PT algorithm taking partial decryption
keys (PDK1,f , . . . ,PDK`,f ) and ciphertexts (c1, . . . , c`), and outputting a string y.
I Definition 1 (Correctness). We say that aMIFE is correct if for all κ ∈ N and ` = poly(κ),
all x1 . . .x` ∈Mκ and all f ∈ Fκ of arity `
Pr
y = f(x1, · · · ,x`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PPi,MSKi)←$ aMIFE.Setup(1κ) (∀i ∈ [`])
ci←$ aMIFE.Enc(MSKi,xi)
PDKi,f ←$ aMIFE.KeyGen(i,MSKi, (PPi)i∈[`], f)
y ← aMIFE.Dec((PDKi,f )i∈[`], (ci)i∈[`])
 = 1 .
I Remark 2. We highlight two ways that ad hoc MIFE differs from standard MIFE [45]. First,
the aMIFE.Setup algorithm is run per user and does not output all of the MSK1, . . .MSKn at
once. Second, the total number of users n and the function arity ` are not fixed and input to
the aMIFE.Setup algorithm. We also note that for simplicity in our formulation of ad hoc
MIFE the public parameters of the parties input to the key generation algorithm are ordered.
I Remark 3. We also consider two relaxations of ad hoc MIFE:
We can allow an additional algorithm CRSGen taking 1κ and outputting a common
reference string CRS that is input to the remaining algorithms. We refer to this as ad
hoc MIFE in the CRS model. The CRS model is weaker than having a key generation
authority who can decrypt all the data.
We can allow the total number of users 1n to be input to the setup algorithm. We refer
to this as bounded ad hoc MIFE. We can additionally require n = `, which we refer to as
static (vs. dynamic) ad hoc MIFE. In particular, static ad hoc MIFE recovers a variant of
MIFE that is similar to the standard one but still eliminates the trusted key generation
authority.
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3.2 Indistinguishability-Based Security
We first present an indistinguishability-based security notion. We note that the fact that the
public parameters of the parties input to the key generation algorithm are ordered allows
us to work with a somewhat simpler definition than the corresponding one in [45] for the
standard MIFE case.
For an ad hoc MIFE scheme aMIFE as above and adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), consider
the experiment in Figure 1.
For an ad hoc MIFE scheme aMIFE as above and adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), consider
the experiment in Figure 1.
Experiment INDaMIFEA (1κ)
(1n, I, (PPi)i∈I , st)←$A0(1κ)
b←$ {0, 1}
For all i /∈ I do:
(MSKi,PPi)←$ aMIFE.Setup(1κ)
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)




Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
If i ∈ {i1, · · · , i`}
and f ∈ Fκ of arity `
PDKi,f ←
aMIFE.KeyGen(i,MSKi, (PPij ), f)
Return PDKi,f
Else return ⊥
Figure 1 Experiment for IND-security of ad hoc MIFE.
We say that f ∈ Fκ is queried if for every user associated with its input wires, either
the user is corrupt, or has submitted it’s partial decryption key to the adversary. Formally,
for every k ∈ ` where ` is the arity of f either ik ∈ I, i.e. ik is corrupted or there is a
key-generation query (ik, (PPi1 , · · · ,PPi`), f).
We call A legitimate if for all κ ∈ N, in all transcripts INDaMIFEA (1κ) it holds that for every
queried f ∈ Fκ, there does not exist two sequences (yi1,0, · · · , yi`,0) and (yi1,1, · · · , yi`,1) such
that
f(yi1,0, · · · , yi`,0) 6= f(yi1,1, · · · , yi`,1)
and for every j ∈ {i1, · · · , i`}
j ∈ I, i.e. j is corrupted (so there is no restriction on yj,0, yj,1 above), or
There is an encryption query (j,x0,x1) such that yj,0 = x0 and yj,1 = x1.
We assume adversaries are legitimate unless otherwise stated. We call A passive if I = ∅.
We call A selective if A2 makes no queries. We say that aMIFE is xxx-IND-secure if for any
adversary A of type xxx
|Pr
[
INDaMIFEA (·) outputs 1
]
− 1/2| = negl(·) .
We provide the definition of simulation based security in Appendix C.
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4 Ad Hoc MIFE from MIFE + Two-Round MPC
We show how to construct of ad hoc MIFE for any polynomial sized circuit from standard
MIFE for the same functionality and a two-round MPC protocol.
Building Blocks
Our scheme will be using the following building blocks:
A MIFE scheme
MIFE = (MIFE.Setup,MIFE.KeyGen,MIFE.Enc,MIFE.Dec)
for some message-space {Mκ}κ∈N and functionality {Fκ}κ∈N. For simplicity, we assume
MIFE.KeyGen is deterministic; note that this is without loss of generality since it can be
made so by using a PRF.
A two-round two-round MPC protocol
MPC = (MPC.RunRoundOne,MPC.RoundRoundTwo,MPC.ComputeResult)
for programs of the form GenKeysf in Figure 2 for f ∈ Fκ. We assume MPC is function-
rerunnable, unbounded and without setup (we discuss the other cases below).
A PRF F with keyspace {Kκ}κ∈N, and a punctured PRF puncF with keyspace {Kpuncκ }κ∈N,
both with domain {0, 1}∗. (We leave the ranges implicit for readability, taking the output
to be sufficiently long.)
A private-key single input functional encryption scheme
FE = (FE.Setup,FE.KeyGen,FE.Enc,FE.Dec)
4.1 Construction
Below we provide our construction for adhoc MIFE for general circuits. Note that setup,
encryption and key generation are done independently and in parallel by all the parties in
the system.
aMIFE.Setup(1κ): Upon input the security parameter, do the following:
1. Sample the seed of PRF K←$Kκ and the seed of a puncturable PRF Kpunc←$Kpuncκ .
Puncturing will only be required in the proof.
2. Invoke the single input FE scheme, (PPFE,MSKFE)←$ FE.Setup(1κ).
3. Invoke the first round of the MPC protocol
(ρ(1), s)←$MPC.RunRoundOne(1κ, (K,MSKFE))
Note that the function is specified later.
4. Return (PP = ρ(1),MSK = (K,Kpunc,MSKFE, s)).
aMIFE.KeyGen((PPi)i∈[`], f,MSK): Upon input the public parameters of the ` parties
that are chosen to participate in the computation, and the master secret key, do the
following:
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1. Parse the public parameters of each party as the first message in an MPC protocol, i.e.
ρ
(1)
i ← PPi ∀i ∈ [`].
2. Parse the master secret key as (K,Kpunc,MSKFE, s)← MSK
3. Run round two of the MPC protocol using round 1 messages as input, for the func-




4. Compute the mask s← PRF.Eval(K, 0 ‖ (PPi)i∈[`] ‖ f)
5. Return (ρ(2), s).
aMIFE.Enc(MSK, x): Upon input the master secret key and the message x, do the following:
1. Parse the master secret key as (K,Kpunc,MSKFE, s)← MSK.
2. Sample the tag T ←$ {0, 1}κ.
3. Initialize the data structure Trap defined in Figure 10 by setting mode-real = 1 and all
other fields as ⊥. This indicates that we are in the real system. The remaining fields
are only relevant in the proof.
4. Compute the ciphertext c←$ FE.Enc(MSKFE, (x, T,Kpunc,Trap)).
5. Return c.
aMIFE.Dec((PDKi,f)i∈[`], (ci)i∈[`]): Upon input the partial decryption keys from all rel-
evant parties, as well as ciphertexts from all relevant parties, do the following:
1. Parse (ρ(2)i , si)← PDKi,f ∀i ∈ [`]
2. Compute the output of the MPC protocol as Z ← MPC.ComputeResult((ρ(2)i )i∈[`])
3. Unmask the output using partial shares provided by all parties. In more detail, compute
S ←⊕i∈[`] si ; Z ← Z⊕S.
4. Parse the output of the MPC computation as (SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . ,SKFE`)← Z.
5. Perform decryption of the single input FE scheme to obtain MIFE ciphertexts ψi ←
FE.Dec(SKFEi , ci) ∀i ∈ [`].
6. Perform decryption of the MIFE scheme to obtain the output y ← MIFE.Dec(SKf , ψ1,
. . . , ψ`).
7. Return y.
I Remark 4. If we use a bounded 2-round MPC protocol then we will obtain a bounded ad hoc
MIFE scheme where the setup algorithm also takes 1n which is passed to MPC.RunRoundOne.
If MPC has a setup algorithm (outputting a CRS) then so does the resulting ad hoc MIFE
scheme.
Correctness
Correctness follows from the correctness of MPC, MIFE and FE. In more detail, we have:
Step 1: MPC. By correctness of MPC, we have that the decryptor recovers the output
S⊕(SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . ,SKFE`). Next, if each party i ∈ [`] provides a partial decryption key
for f , then this contains partial mask si as part of the output of aMIFE.KeyGen. Using
these, the decryptor can compute S ←⊕i∈[`] si and recover (SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . ,SKFE`).
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Function GenKeys(PPi)i∈[`],f ((K1,MSKFE1), . . . , (K`,MSKFE`))
1. For i ∈ [`], compute randomness to be used for algorithms below:
ri ← PRF.Eval(Ki, 1 ‖ (PPi)i∈[`] ‖ f), r′i ← PRF.Eval(Ki, 2 ‖ (PPi)i∈[`] ‖ f)
2. Run the MIFE setup algorithm for the desired arity as:
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← MIFE.Setup(1κ; r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r`)
3. For i ∈ [`], generate the single input FE function key:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,⊥; r′i)
4. Compute the MIFE secret key as SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
5. Sample the mask si for each partial key and compute the mask S as:




6. Return the masked output S⊕(SKf , SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Figure 2 Functionality computed by the MPC protocol to generate single and multi input FE
keys.
Function ReEncEK,ctr(x, T,K,Trap)
1. Let r ← PRF.Eval(K, 0 ‖ EK ‖ T ).
2. If mode = R then compute MIFE.Enc(EK,x; r) and return it.
3. If mode = T and ctr < Trap.index then compute MIFE.Enc(EK,Trap.val1; r) and return it.
4. If mode = T and ctr > Trap.index then compute MIFE.Enc(EK,Trap.val0; r) and return it.
5. If mode = T and ctr = Trap.index then output Trap.CT.
Figure 3 Functionality for translating the ciphertext from FE to MIFE using dynamically
generated encryption keys.
Step 2: FE. Next, by correctness of FE, we have that if
ψi = FE.Dec(SKFEi , ci) ∀i ∈ [`]
Then, ψi are the MIFE ciphertexts computed as MIFE.Enc(EKi,xi; ri).
Step 3: MIFE. Finally, by correctness of MIFE, we have that
f(x1, . . . ,x`) = MIFE.Dec(SKf , ψ1, . . . , ψ`)
4.2 Security Proof
In this section, we argue that the scheme described above is secure. In more detail:
I Theorem 5. If MIFE is a IND-secure MIFE scheme and MPC is a SIM-secure 2-round
MPC protocol, then our construction is sel-IND-secure.
Due to space constraints, the proof can be found in Appendix D.
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5 Ad Hoc Friendly MIFE and its Application to Inner Products
In this section, we describe a paradigm for constructing ad-hoc MIFE schemes from MIFE
schemes that are “ad hoc friendly” and a (hopefully simple) two-round MPC protocol. This
paradigm significantly simplifies our general construction. We then show that the standard
MIFE scheme for inner products [3, 2], which may be based on DDH, LWE or DCR, is ad
hoc friendly and the corresponding two-round MPC protocol is only required to compute
inner-products, thus obtaining an efficient ad hoc MIFE scheme for inner products.
Ad Hoc Friendliness
In more detail, we define a notion of “ad hoc friendly” standard MIFE which satisfies the
following properties:
Decentralized Setup. The MIFE.Setup algorithm of the MIFE is decentralized in the
sense that:
1. The encryption keys EKi for i ∈ [n] corresponding to party i may be generated
independently of the encryption keys of the remaining parties [n]\ i. In more detail, the
algorithm (EK1, . . . ,EKn)← MIFE.Setup(1κ) may be decomposed into n invocations
EKi ← MIFE.SetupLocal(1κ) for i ∈ [n], which can be run locally by each party.
2. The master secret key MSK can be decomposed into n components {MSKi}i∈[n]. The
partial MSKi corresponding to party i may be generated locally by party i, without
any interaction or shared state with the remaining parties.
Local Encryption. The MIFE.Enc algorithm of the MIFE is “local” in that it does not
take as input the total number of parties or the public parameters of other parties. In
more detail, MIFE.Enc algorithm only takes as input its encryption key EKi and its input
xi, and nothing else.
Piecewise Master Secret Key. In standard MIFE schemes, the function is assumed
to have fixed arity n. However, in ad hoc MIFE, we allow the function to have arity
` < n. To support this, we require that the master secret in standard MIFE MSK =
{MSK1, . . . ,MSKn}, if restricted to some subset S ⊆ [n] with |S| = `, has the same
distribution as a master secret generated for functions of arity `.
Formally, let MSK = {MSK1, . . . ,MSKn} ← FE.Setup(1κ, 1n) and MSK′ = {MSK′1,
. . . ,MSK′`} ← FE.Setup(1κ, 1`). Then, we require that MSK restricted to subset S,
namely (MSKS[1], . . . ,MSKS[`]) has the same distribution as MSK′.
Since the intuition was discussed in Section 1, we proceed to our construction of ad hoc
MIFE for inner products.
5.1 Ad Hoc MIFE for Inner Products
Inner-product functionality
We recall the multi-input inner-product functionality over Zp for a prime p, adapted from
Abdalla et al. [2, Section 2.3]. For m,n ∈ N, this is the functionality
IPmp,n = {ipy1,...,yn : (Zmp )n → Zp}
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defined by
ipy1,...,yn(x1, . . . ,xn) =
n∑
i=1
〈xi,yi〉 mod p .
We omit parameters p,m, n when they are arbitrary or clear from context.
5.2 Building Blocks
In the context of ad hoc MIFE for inner products, we want to evaluate a functionality given
by a sequence of vectors y = (y1, . . . ,yn) where yi ∈ Zmq . Evaluating the function on inputs
{xi}i∈[n] where xi ∈ Zmq reveals
∑
i∈[n]〈xi,yi〉 and nothing more. In particular the evaluator
should not be able to learn the partial sums 〈xi,yi〉.
Our scheme will be using the following building blocks:
A 2-round function-rerunnable MPC for a functionality GenKey-ip, which must be support
inner product computation.
A standard MIFE with for the inner product functionality, denoted by MIFEip, satisfying
the aforementioned ad hoc friendly properties.
The MIFE scheme(s) of Abdalla et al. [2]:
Abdalla et al. [2] provide two multi-input encryption schemes for inner products, one
for computing inner products over some finite ring ZL, and the second for computing
bounded-norm inner products over the integers. Both schemes rely on:
1. An information theoretic scheme for inner products where only one ciphertext query is
supported.
2. A single input functional encryption scheme FE for inner products which is applied on
top of the above one time scheme.
Unrolling the above two components, the final MIFE scheme(s) of [2] have algorithms of the
form described below.
Below, we unroll the above two components to establish that the schemes of [2] satisfy
ad hoc friendliness.
1. Decentralized Setup. The encryption keys EKi corresponding to party i may be gener-
ated independently of the encryption keys of the remaining parties [n] \ i. In more detail,
the setup algorithm is defined as:
MIFE.Setup(1κ, n): Do the following:
For i ∈ [n], sample ui ← ZmL .
For i ∈ [n], sample (FE.PKi,FE.MSKi)← FE.Setup(1κ, 1m).
Output PPi = FE.PKi and EKi = (FE.MSKi, ui) for i ∈ [n].
Then, we may define:
a. MIFE.SetupLocal(1κ, n): Do the following:
Sample u← ZmL .
Sample (FE.PK,FE.MSK)← FE.Setup(1κ, 1m).
Output PP = FE.PP and EK = (FE.MSK, u).
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To compute the set of n encryption keys, the algorithm MIFE.SetupLocal(1κ, n) is invoked
n times. Additionally, in [2], the master secret key can be decomposed into n components
by setting:
MSKi = EKi = (FE.MSKi,ui) ∀ i ∈ [n]
2. Local Encryption. The encryption algorithm only takes its encryption key and message
as input and does not depend on the number of parties or their public parameters. In
more detail, the encryption algorithm is defined as:
MIFE.Enc(EKi,xi): Do the following:
Parse EKi = (FE.MSKi, ui).
Compute yi = xi + ui mod L.
Compute ci = FE.Enc(FE.MSKi,yi).
Output (yi, ci).
Thus, the ciphertext encoding party i’s input may be computed independently by party i.
3. Piecewise Master Secret Key. For the inner product functionality, if MSK =
(MSK1, . . . ,MSKn) is the master secret key for function vector y = (y1‖...‖yn) then
for any S ⊆ [n], we have the corresponding master key
MSK′ = (MSKS[1], . . . ,MSKS[`]) is a well formed master secret key for the vector
y′ = (yS[1]‖ . . . ‖yS[`]). In more detail, the key generation algorithm is defined as:







It is easy to see that the function key for y′ can be obtained from the above by simply
setting yi = 0 for i /∈ S.
5.3 Our Construction
We are now ready to present the construction. Note that for ease of presentation, we describe
the scheme for all n users but we remark that it works for any subset of ` ≤ n users.
aMIFE.Setup(1κ, 1m): Upon input the security parameter and the dimension of the input
vector for each party, do the following:
1. Run the partial MIFE setup algorithm to obtain the public parameters and encryption
key: (MIFE.PP,MIFE.EK)←$MIFE.SetupLocal(1κ, 1m)
2. Invoke the first round of the MPC protocol with the encryption key as input:
(ρ(1), s)←$MPC.RunRoundOne(1κ,EK)
3. Return PP := (MIFE.PP, ρ(1)),MSK := (MIFE.EK, s)
aMIFE.Enc(EK, x): Upon input the encryption key and the input, compute MIFE.enc(EK,x)
and output it.
aMIFE.KeyGen((PPi)i∈[`], y,MSKi): Upon input the public parameters of the ` parties,
the function vector y and the master secret key MSKi, do the following:
1. Parse (MIFE.EK, s)← MSKi and (MIFE.PPj , ρ(1)j )← PPj ∀j ∈ [`]
2. Parse (y1, . . . ,y`)← y where yj ∈ Zmq for j ∈ [`].
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3. Invoke round 2 of the MPC protocol GenKey-ipy as defined in Figure 4
ρ(2)←$MPC.RunRoundTwo(s, ρ(1)1 , . . . , ρ(1)` , )
4. Return PDK := ρ(2).
aMIFE.Dec((PDKi,f)i∈[`], (ci)i∈[`]): Upon input the partial decryption keys from all rel-
evant parties, as well as ciphertexts from all relevant parties, do the following:
1. Compute the output of the MPC protocol as
MIFE.DKy ← MPC.ComputeResult((ρ(2)i )i∈[`])
2. Compute MIFE.Dec(MIFE.DKy,y, c1, . . . , c`) and output it.
Function GenKey-ipy(EK1, . . . ,EK`)
1. Let MIFE.MSK = (EK1, . . . ,EK`).
2. Compute MIFE.KeyGen(MIFE.MSK,y) and output it.
Figure 4 Functionality for computing the MIFE function key.
Note that for the inner product functionality, the MIFE key generation algorithm is very
simple and in some cases only involves computing inner products, please see [2] for details.
Correctness
Correctness follows from correctness of the MPC protocol and of the standard MIFE
scheme. We have by correctness of the MPC protocol, that the output MIFE.DKy =
MIFE.KeyGen(MSK,y) is produced correctly. Since the encryptors encrypted ci =
MIFE.Enc(EKi,xi), it follows from the correctness of MIFE that MIFE.Dec(MIFE.DKy,y, c1,
. . . , c`) outputs
∑
i∈[`]
〈yi, xi〉 as desired.
Security
Given the proof of security in Section 4, the proof of security of the present construction is
straightforward, since the present construction is a (much) simplified instance of the general
construction. Intuitively, the security of MPC ensures that the output MIFE.DKy, which
is computed using inputs (MSKi,yi)i∈[`] of ` disjoint parties, is indistinguishable from the
output of a “global” MIFE key generation algorithm which takes the entire (MSK,y) as input.
The encryption algorithm is exactly the same as that of the standard MIFE scheme, with
the result that the decryptor sees exactly the same view as in the standard MIFE scheme.
Please see Appendix E for details.
An issue with the MIFE scheme of Abdalla et al. [2] which we use above is that an
adversary may exploit partial ciphertexts to learn unauthorized information [43]. Specifically,
say there are two parties, and the first one provides ciphertexts, for vectors x0 and x1 (say).
The second encryptor does not give any ciphertexts. Suppose the key generation algorithm
in the standard MIFE scheme gives a key for (y ‖ 0). Now, it could be that 〈x0,y〉 6= 〈x1,y〉
but this does not violate admissibility, because admissibility only checks for decryption with
respect to complete ciphertexts whereas decryption with respect to partial ciphertexts is
not defined. Ideally, the key for (y ‖ 0) should not work to decrypt the partial ciphertexts
of encryptor 1, but in the construction of Abdalla et al., it does so (if the corresponding
sub-vector in the key is zero).
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Note that in a MIFE scheme, the above situation only occurs if one party (party 2 say)
never gives any ciphertext5. In our setting however, a party issues a partial decryption key
only if it wishes its data to participate in some computation. Hence, we resolve the issue by
requiring that a party only issue a partial decryption key if it has also issued at least one
ciphertext.
Instantiating MPC
Since function-rerunnable two-round MPC in the common reference string (CRS) model
can be constructed [28, 57, 24, 59] from learning-with-errors (LWE), we get ad hoc MIFE
for inner products from LWE. This result can be upgraded to the malicious setting as the
additional cost of NIZKs.
While function rerunnable two-round MPC in the CRS model can be constructed from
bilinear maps [41] and even two-round oblivious transfer [15, 42, 39] or information theoretic-
ally [9, 36], these constructions are not function-rerunnable so do not suffice for multi-key ad
hoc MIFE. However, if we restrict ourselves to the setting of bounded ad hoc MIFE, where a
user issues only a bounded number of partial decryption keys and additionally maintains
state across key issues, we may use the above MPC protocols (just via repetition). This
yields such a bounded ad hoc MIFE under DDH, LWE or DCR for the both the semi-honest
and malicious cases. One nice feature of the semi-honest construction is that it does not use
a common random string and is in the plain model.
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A Additional Related Work
Functional Encryption
FE started with the notion of “attribute-based encryption” [61, 50] and evolved over time to
a more general primitive that encompasses several primitives such as (hierarchical) identity
based encryption [19, 29, 22, 44, 25, 4], attribute based encryption [61, 50, 16, 34], predicate
encryption [21, 47, 54, 55, 5, 62, 47] and reusable garbled circuits [46]. Formal definitions
of the general primitive were first given in [20, 58]. While there has been substantial
progress in constructing FE from standard assumptions [1, 7, 56], the general notion of FE
for arbitrary polynomial sized circuits was constructed in the breakthrough work of [33]
from indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [12, 33, 56]. Functional encryption for restricted
functionalities such as inner products [1, 7], and quadratic functions [56, 11] from more
standard assumptions has also been developed.
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Multi-Input Functional Encryption
Extending the more basic concept of functional encryption (FE) [61, 20, 58], the notion of
multi-input function encryption (MIFE) was first introduced by Goldwasser et al. [45] and
there have since been a number of follow-up works. Ananth and Jain [8] show that private
key MIFE for general polynomial-arity functions implies iO. On the other hand, Brakerski,
Komargodski and Segev [23] construct private-key MIFE for constant-arity functions, based on
a private-key single-input FE scheme. They achieve adaptive security but also do not consider
sender corruption. Badrinarayanan et al. [10] construct MIFE schemes for “unbounded arity”
functions. More recent work [3, 2] constructs inner-product MIFE.
Multi-Party Computation
Traditional MPC is interactive. Ad hoc MIFE can be seen as a special form of non-interactive
MPC [31, 14, 53]. In particular, ad hoc MIFE separates inputs and functions, which affords
greater flexibility – one can use the same encrypted inputs with different functions, or different
encrypted inputs with the same function. Moreover, previous non-interactive MPC protocols
require a global setup procedure. In a recent work, [52] constructs non-interactive MPC from
indistinguishability obfuscation and DDH, assuming a PKI setup and a CRS, without this
requirement. In contrast, our schemes are based on standard MIFE for a given functionality
and do not require a CRS in general, as we do not necessarily consider sender corruption.
Multi-Authority Functional Encryption
Our work should also be compared to that of Chandran et al. [26], who proposed a notion
of “multi-authority” FE (MAFE). In MAFE, key authorities independently generate their
own keys. Roughly speaking, to derive a decryption key for a function f , a user must obtain
a partial decryption key for f from each authority. In our context, we could think of the
authorities as sources. However, a fundamental difference between multi-authority FE and
ad hoc MIFE is that in the former, to encrypt, one needs to know the master public keys
of all authorities (users). This is a severe limitation, as a user may not be aware of which
other parties are to be involved in a computation at the time of encryption. Furthermore, in
multi-authority FE, a given ciphertext can only be used in a computation associated with
one fixed group, unlike ad hoc MIFE, where a ciphertext can be used in an unbounded
number of dynamically-chosen groups. Finally, in MAFE, decryption only operates on a
single ciphertext, unlike our notion which is intrinsically multi-user.
B Preliminaries
In this section we define the notation and preliminaries used in our work.
B.1 Notation and Conventions
PPT stands for “probabilistic polynomial time” and PT stands for “polynomial time.”
Algorithms are PPT unless otherwise noted. Throughout, κ denotes the security parameter
and 1κ its unary encoding. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote by A(x; r) the output
of A on input x with random tape r. We denote y←$A(x) as the process of sampling r
at random and letting y ← A(x; r). For a finite set S, we denote x←$ S as the process
of sampling x uniformly from S. For a distribution D we denote x←$D as the process of
sampling x according to D. For k ∈ N we let [k] denote the set {1, · · · , k}. If s is string
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then |s| denotes its length and s[i] denotes its i-th bit. If x is a vector then |x| denotes its
number of components and x[i] denotes its i-th component. We will use negl(·) to denote
an unspecified negligible function and poly(·) to denote an unspecified polynomial. We say
that (families of) distributions {D0,κ}κ∈N, {D1,κ}κ∈N are computationally indistinguishable





A 2-round MPC protocol MPC for message-space {Mκ}κN and functionality {Fκ}κ∈N where
for each κ ∈ N each f ∈ Fκ is a function on (Mκ)n for some n, consists of three algorithms
with the following syntax:
RunRoundOne(1κ, 1n, f, i, x): A PPT algorithm taking the security parameter κ, number
of users n, a (description of a) function f ∈ Fκ of arity n, an index i ∈ [n], an input
x ∈Mκ, and outputting a first protocol message ρ(1) and secret s.
RunRoundTwo(s, (ρ(1)1 , . . . , ρ
(1)
n )): A PPT algorithm taking a secret s and the first protocol
message for all n parties ρ(1)1 , . . . , ρ
(1)
n , and outputting a second protocol message ρ(2).
ComputeResult: A PT algorithm taking as input the n second-round protocol messages
ρ
(2)
1 , . . . , ρ
(2)
n for each party and outputting a value y.
Correctness




(ρ(1)i , si)←$ RunRoundOne(1κ, 1n, f, i,xi) ∀i ∈ [n]
ρ
(2)
i ←$ RunRoundTwo(si, (ρ(1)1 , . . . , ρ(1)n )) ∀i ∈ [n]
y ← ComputeResult(ρ(2)1 , . . . , ρ(2)n )
 = 1 .
I Remark 6. The above definition of two-round MPC is without setup (i.e., a CRS). We also
consider the case that there is an additional algorithm CRSGen taking 1κ and outputting
a common reference string CRS that is input to the remaining algorithms. We call this
two-round MPC in the CRS model.
We say that MPC is unbounded if the output of RunRoundOne does not depend on n.
In this case, we input n to RunRoundTwo instead of RunRoundOne. We call MPC input-
delayed (resp. function-delayed) if the output of RunRoundOne does not depend on x (resp. f)
but just on 1|x| (resp. 1|f |). In this case, we input x (resp. f) to RunRoundTwo instead of
RunRoundOne. We call MPC input-rerunnable (resp. function-rerunnable) if it is input-delayed
(resp. function-delayed) and if RunRoundTwo can be executed multiple times with different
input choices (resp. function choices) while still preserving the security properties of the
MPC protocol (see below).
Security
Let MPC be a 2-round MPC protocol as above. Let Coins be the coin-space for the protocol.
For an adversary A = (A0,A1) and simulator S, consider the experiments in Figure 5. We
say that A is passive (aka. semi-honest) of I = ∅. We say that MPC is SIM-secure if for
any PPT adversary A there is a stateful PPT simulator S = ( ˜CRSGen, E˜xtract, S˜im) such
that REALMPCA (·) and IDEALMPCA,S (·) are computationally indistinguishable. Note that
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Experiment REALMPCA (1κ)
(Optional) crs←$ CRSGen(1κ)
(1n, I, f, (xi)i/∈I)←$A0(1κ)
// f ∈ Fκ of arity n, xi ∈Mκ
((ρ(1)i )i∈I , st)←$A1(n, I, f)
For i /∈ I do:
ri←$ Coins(1κ)
(ρ(1)i , si)
←$ RunRoundOne(1κ, 1n, f, i, xi; ri)




←$ RunRoundTwo(si, (ρ(1)1 , . . . , ρ(1)n ); ri)




(1n, I, f, (xi)i/∈I)←$A0(1κ)
// f ∈ Fκ of arity n, xi ∈Mκ
((ρ(1)i )i∈I , st)←$A1(n, I, f)




←$ S˜im((xi)i∈I , f(x1, . . . , xn))
α←$A2(st, (ρ(1)i , ρ(2)i )i/∈I)
Return α
Figure 5 Experiments for SIM-security of two-round MPC.
simulation of the first-round protocol messages for the honest parties are independent of the
inputs, so for convenience and ease of presentation we will partition the algorithm S˜im into
two algorithms: S˜im1 and S˜im2, defined as follows:
S˜im1() 7→ (ρ(1)i )i/∈I : Outputs the first-round protocol messages for the honest parties.
S˜im2((xi)i∈I , y) 7→ (ρ(2)i )i/∈I : On input the inputs of the corrupted parties along with the
target output value of the protocol, S˜im2 outputs the second-round protocol messages for
the honest parties.
Input/Function-Rerunnability
For simplicity, the definition in Figure 5 does not capture input/function-rerunnability. It
is straightforward to see how the definition can be extended. For example in the case of
function-rerunnability (the situation is analogous for input-rerunnability where inputs and
functions are swapped), the changes to the definition are (1) A0 outputs a set of functions
{fi} instead of a single function, (2) in the real experiment RunRoundTwo is executed for
each function, (3) in the ideal experiement S˜im2 is called for each function, and (4) the
complete set of second-round protocol messages for all functions is given to A2.
Input Extractability
Our results in this work rely on the simulator’s ability to extract the inputs of the corrupted
parties, hence the need for the E˜xtract algorithm. In the semi-honest setting, extraction is
not necessary. In the malicious case, both known constructions of two-round MPC [33, 57]
for general functions satisfy the above extractability property, albeit in the CRS model.
B.3 Punctured Pseudorandom Functions
A PRF F is specified by two algorithms:
PRF.Setup(1κ) : The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter and outputs
a description of the key space Kκ, domain X , range Y as well as the PRF key K.
PRF.Eval(K,x) : The eval algorithm takes a key K ∈ Kκ and domain point x ∈ Xκ and
outputs a range point y ∈ Yκ.
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is negligible in κ, where K ← PRF.Setup(1κ) and $(·) denotes a random function from Xκ
to Yκ.
A punctureable PRF additionally includes an algorithm PRF.Punc which takes as input
a PRF key K and a point x∗ ∈ X and outputs a punctured key Kx∗ . For correctness, we
require that PRF.Eval(Kx∗ , x) = PRF.Eval(K,x) for all x 6= x∗ and ⊥ when x = x∗.
Security of punctured PRF
The security game between the challenger and the adversary A consists of the following four
phases.
Setup Phase: The challenger samples a PRF key K and a random bit b.
Evaluation Query Phase: The adversary A queries for polynomially many evaluations. For
each evaluation query x, the challenger sends F(K,x) to A.
Challenge Phase: A chooses a challenge x∗ and the challenger computes
Kx∗ ← PRF.Punc(K,x∗). If b = 0, the challenger outputs Kx∗ and F(K,x∗). Else,
the challenger outputs Kx∗ and y←$ Y chosen uniformly at random.
Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess b′ of b.
The adversary A wins if b′ = b and the adversary did not query for evaluation on x∗.
The advantage of A is defined to be
AdvFA(1κ) = |Pr[A wins]− 1/2|
The PRF F is a secure puncturable PRF if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries
A, we have that AdvFA(1κ) is negligible in κ.
B.4 Multi-Input Functional Encryption
An n-input FE scheme [45] MIFE for a message space {Mκ}κ∈N and a functionality {Fκ}κ∈N,
where for each κ ∈ N, each f ∈ Fκ is a (description of a) function on (Mκ)n, is given by a
set of algorithms with the following syntax:
MIFE.Setup(1κ, 1n): A PPT algorithm taking the security parameter κ and number of
users n, and outputting the master secret key MSK and encryption keys (EK1, . . . ,EKn).
MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f): A PT algorithm taking a master secret key MSK, a function
f ∈ Fκ and outputting a corresponding decryption key DKf .
MIFE.Enc(EK,x): A PPT algorithm taking an encryption key EK and a message x ∈Mκ,
and outputting a ciphertext c.
MIFE.Dec(DKf , (c1, . . . , cn)): A PT algorithm taking decryption key DKf and vector of
ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cn), and outputting a string y.
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Correctness
We say that MIFE is correct if for all κ,∈ N, x1 . . .xn ∈Mκ and f ∈ Fκ
Pr
y = f(x1, · · · ,xn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
((EK1, . . . ,EKn),MSK)←$MIFE.Setup(1κ)
ci←$MIFE.Enc(EKi,xi) ∀i ∈ [n]
DKf ←$MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
y ← MIFE.Dec(DKf , (c1, . . . , cn))
 = 1 .
I Remark 7. We remark that our formulation of MIFE assumes that the senders (as in
our application an encryptor is referred to as a sender or source) are ordered. This allows
for consistency with our formulation of ad hoc MIFE and allows us to simplify exposition
versus [45].
Indistinguishability-Based Security
For an n-input FE scheme MIFE as above and adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), consider the




((EK1, . . . ,EKn),MSK)
←$MIFE.Setup(1κ)
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·)2 ((EKi)i∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)









Figure 6 Experiment for IND-security of standard MIFE.
We call A legitimate if for all κ ∈ N, in all transcripts INDMIFEA (1κ) it holds that for every
key generation query f there does not exist two sequences (y1,0, · · · , yn,0) and (y1,1, · · · , yn,1)
such that
f(y1,0, · · · , yn,0) 6= f(y1,1, · · · , yn,1)
and for every j ∈ [n]
j ∈ I, i.e. j is corrupted (so there is no restriction on yj,0, yj,1 above), or
there is an encryption query (j,x0,x1) such that yj,0 = x0 and yj,1 = x1.
We assume adversaries are legitimate unless otherwise stated. We call A passive if I = ∅.




INDMIFEA (·) outputs 1
]
− 1/2| = negl(·) .
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Simulation-Based Security
For an MIFE scheme MIFE as above, adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), and simulator S =
(S˜etup, E˜nc, K˜eyGen), consider the experiments in Figure 7. Here qenc,i is the number of
encryption queries for user i ∈ [n]. We say that A is q-bounded if qenc,i ≤ q for all i ∈ [n].
We say that MIFE is SEL-SIM-secure if for any adversary A there is a simulator S such that
REALMIFEA (·) and IDEALMIFEA,S (·) are computationally indistinguishable.
I Remark 8. For consistency with our formulation of simulation-based security for ad hoc
MIFE, we restrict the above definition to the selective-security and passive (no sender
corruption) setting.
Experiment REALMIFEA (1κ)
((EK1, . . . ,EKn),MSK)←$MIFE.Setup(1κ)
(mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qenc,i]←$A1(1κ)





((E˜K1, . . . , E˜Kn), M˜SK)←$ S˜etup(1κ)
(mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qenc,i]←$A1(st)
For all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [qenc,i] do:
c˜i,j ←$ E˜nc(M˜SK, |mi,j |)
α←$AO˜kg(·,·,·)2 ((E˜Ki)i∈[n], (c˜i,j))
Return ((mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qenc,i], α)
Oracle Okg(f) // f ∈ Fκ
DKf ←$MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
Return DKf




Figure 7 Experiments for SIM-security of standard MIFE.
B.5 Function-Private Functional Encryption
A functional encryption scheme, denoted as FE [20], is a tuple of algorithms
FE = (FE.Setup,FE.KeyGen,FE.Enc,FE.Dec) for a message space {Mκ}κ∈N and a function-
ality {Fκ}κ∈N, where for each κ ∈ N, each f ∈ Fκ is a (description of a) function onMκ.
The syntax is the same as for a 1-input MIFE scheme where EK1 = MSK and I = ∅. The
correctness requirement remains the same, as well the notion of indistinguishability based
security (which we refer to as “message privacy”).
Function Privacy
We additionally define the notion of function privacy as follows. For an FE scheme FE as
above and adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), consider the experiment in Figure 8.
We call A legitimate if for all κ ∈ N, in all transcripts FPFEA (1κ) it holds that for every
key generation query f0, f1 there does not exist an encryption query x ∈Mκ such that
f0(x) 6= f1(x) .
We assume adversaries are legitimate unless otherwise stated. We say that FE is FP-secure if
for any adversary A
|Pr
[
FPFEA (·) outputs 1
]
− 1/2| = negl(·) .
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Figure 8 Experiment for FP-security of FE.
C Simulation Based Security for Ad Hoc MIFE
We now present a simulation-based definition of security. The definition has a number of
restrictions that we justify below.
For an ad hoc MIFE scheme aMIFE as above, adversary A = (A0,A1,A2), and simulator
S = (S˜etup, E˜nc, K˜eyGen), consider the experiments in Figure 9. Here qE,i is the number of
encryption queries for user i ∈ [n]. We say that A is q-bounded if qE,i ≤ q for all i ∈ [n].
Experiment REALaMIFEA (1κ)
(1n, st)←$A0(1κ)
For all i ∈ [n] do:
(MSKi,PPi)←$ aMIFE.Setup(1κ)
(mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qE,i]←$A1(st)
For all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [qE,i] do:
ci,j ←$ aMIFE.Enc(MSKi,mi,j)
α←$AOkg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i∈[n], (ci,j))
Return (1n, (mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qE,i], α)
Experiment IDEALaMIFEA,S (1κ)
(1n, st)←$A0(1κ) // I ⊂ [n]
For all i ∈ [n] do:
(M˜SKi, P˜Pi)←$ S˜etup(1κ)
(mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qE,i]←$A1(st)
For all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [qE,i] do:
c˜i,j ←$ E˜nc(M˜SKi, |mi,j |)
α←$AO˜kg(·,·,·)2 ((P˜Pi)i∈[n], (c˜i,j))
Return (1n, (mi,j)i∈[n],j∈[qE,i], α)
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
If i ∈ {i1, · · · , i`}, and f ∈ Fκ of arity `
PDKi,f ←
aMIFE.KeyGen(i,MSKi, (PPij )j∈[`], f)
Return PDKi,f
Else return ⊥
Oracle O˜kg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
If i ∈ {i1, · · · , i`}, and f ∈ Fκ of arity `
q ← (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
P˜DKi,f ←
K˜eyGen(q, (f(mik,jik ))jik∈[qE,ik ], (M˜SKij ))
Return P˜DKi,f
Else return ⊥
Figure 9 Experiments for SIM-security of ad hoc MIFE.
We say that aMIFE is xxx-SEL-SIM-secure if for any adversary A of type xxx there is a
simulator S such that REALaMIFEA (·) and IDEALaMIFEA,S (·) are computationally indistinguish-
able.
I Remark 9. The above definition has a number of restrictions that we now justify:
The adversary is passive and does not corrupt any sender. This is justified because
otherwise such a scheme implies virtual black-box obfuscation as in the case of standard
MIFE [45], which is impossible [12].
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The adversary is selective and chooses its challenge messages before seeing the public
parameters of the users. We focus on this formulation for simplicity and leave the study
of adaptive security for ad hoc MIFE in the case of simulation-based security for future
work.
The simulator is black-box. This is for simplicity as it is stronger than allowing non-
black-box simulation and our constructions achieve it.
D Proof of Theorem 5
I Theorem 5. If MIFE is a IND-secure MIFE scheme and MPC is a SIM-secure 2-round
MPC protocol, then our construction is sel-IND-secure.
Proof. The proof of security makes use of a trapdoor data structure which is defined in
Figure 10.
The trapdoor data structure
Here, mode is used to indicate whether we are in the real mode Real or trapdoor mode
Trap. CT indicates the hardwired MIFE CT which must be output if the field index equals
the counter ctr set in the FE key. The fields val0 and val1 are used to indicate the values
corresponding to bit 0 and bit 1 respectively, where the latter is used when index > ctr and
the former when index < ctr.
mode CT index val0 val1
Figure 10 Data Structure Trap used for Proof.
The Hybrids
We prove the theorem via a hybrid argument. We describe our hybrids below.
Hybrid 0: This is the real game in which on every encryption query (i,x0,x1), x0 is
encrypted.
Suppose there are Qc encryption queries (made selectively). For each k ∈ [Qc], let i be
the party index queried, x0 and x1 the challenge plaintexts, let T be the tag used during
encryption and I be the set of users corrupted by the adversary. We use these definitions in
the remainder of the proof.
Hybrid 1: The change in this hybrid is twofold.
1. Simulate the Public Parameters. We set the first-round protocol message ρ(1)i for
MPC in the public parameters to the output of the simulator S˜im1 for each uncorrupted
user i /∈ I.
2. Simulate the Function Key. For each key generation query (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f), we do
the following.
a. Let J , I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`} be the subset of corrupted users and J¯ = {i1, . . . , i`} \ J be
the subset of honest users.
b. We use the simulator’s E˜xtract algorithm to compute xj ← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) for each
corrupted party j ∈ J where PPj = ρ(1)j , then compute y = GenKeysf (xi1 , . . . ,xi`)
where xj for j ∈ J¯ is (honest) party j’s input to the MPC protocol.
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c. Compute (ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ← S˜im2((xj)j∈J , y) and s ← PRF.Eval(Ki, 0 ‖ (PPij )j∈[`]‖f). Re-
turn (ρ(2)i , s).
See Figure 11 for a formal description.
Indistinguishability of the hybrids follows from the SIM-security of the MPC protocol.
As we see in Figure 11, the only difference from Hybrid 0 is that the inputs of the corrupt
parties are extracted using the E˜xtract algorithm and the protocol transcript is generated
using the MPC simulator. Hence, an adversary who distinguishes between Hybrids 0 and 1
implies an adversary against the MPC protocol by a standard reduction.
Hybrid 1:






(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J
(Kj ,MSKFEj )← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) ∀j ∈ J
y ← GenKeysf ((Ki1 ,MSKFEi1 ), . . . , (Ki` ,MSKFEi` )
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2(Kj ,MSKFEj )j∈J , y)
s← PRF.Eval(Ki, 0 ‖ (PPij )j∈[`] ‖ f)
Return (ρ(2)i , s).
Figure 11 Hybrid 1.
Hybrid 2: In this hybrid, we replace the outputs of the PRF on key Ki for the honest users
i with uniformly random strings in the function GenKeys described in Figure 2. For every key
query pertaining to parties (i1, . . . , i`) and function f and every honest party i, we replace
PRF.Eval(Ki, k ‖ (PPij )j∈[`] ‖ f) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2} as in Hybrid 1 with a fresh uniformly
random string. The changes are formally described in Figure 12 wherein the algorithm R is
used to generate random strings and keep track of those previously generated.
Indistinguishability of Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 follows from the security of the PRF. More
precisely, a standard argument iterates through sub-hybrids for each honest party, replacing
the PRF outputs with uniformly random strings.
Hybrid 3: In this hybrid, we change how y (the target output passed to S˜im2) is generated
in each query ((i1, . . . , i`), f). In this hybrid, y is randomly sampled. Furthermore for a pair
((i1, . . . , i`), f) that is fully queried i.e. a partial decryption query (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f) is made
for each i ∈ {i1, . . . , i`} \ I, the final partial decryption key that is issued has its masking
value, i.e. the second component of the partial decryption key, generated differently. It is
generated as
s← y ⊕ S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ GenKeys′′((r′1,MSKFE1), . . . , (r′`,MSKFE`))
Here S1 and S2 are computed so as to satisfy requisite dependencies. Figure 13 captures
these changes formally.
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Hybrid 2:









(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J





j )←$RΓ(j, (i1, . . . , i`), f) ∀j ∈ J¯
∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ J :
γ
(m)





y ← S ⊕ GenKeys′({(rk, r′l,MSKFEk )}k∈[`])
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2(Kj ,MSKFEj )j∈J , y)
Return (ρ(2)i , s := γ
(0)
i )




SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
∀i ∈ [`]:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,⊥; r′i)
Return (SKf , SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Algorithm RΓ(i, (i1, . . . , i`, f)
If (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2)) ∈ Γ
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Else
γ(j)←$ {0, 1}rp ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
// where rp is the range of the PRF
Γ← Γ ∪ {(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))}
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Figure 12 Hybrid 2.
Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 are distributed identically. First, y is distributed uniformly in
both hybrids for all group-function pairs ((i1, . . . , i`), f) that are not fully queried. In the
case of a group-function pair ((i1, . . . , i`), f) that is fully queried, each partial decryption




si = GenKeys′′((r′1,MSKFE1), . . . , (r′`,MSKFE`))
This is distributed the same as the output of GenKeys′ in the previous hybrid. Hence the y
values are distributed identically in both hybrids.
Hybrid 4: Let Qk be the number of subset-function pairs that are fully queried. In this
hybrid, the key generation algorithm keeps track of the query number ctr ∈ [Qk] in the ad
hoc MIFE function keys. In more detail, the algorithm GenKeys′′ invoked for query index j
for all j ∈ [Qk] is modified to invoke ReEnc with parameter ctr = j (please refer to Figure 3)
instead of ⊥.
We claim that by function hiding of FE, the two hybrids are indistinguishable. To see
this, note that since mode = R in all the FE ciphertexts, changing the ctr value in the FE key
has no effect on the decryption value obtained, since this field is only relevant in the trapdoor
mode, i.e. when mode = T . Hence, the decryption values for both keys remain exactly the
same. Then, by security of FE, we have that Hybrids 3 and 4 are indistinguishable. The
formal reduction is standard, and constructs everything except the FE ciphertexts and FE
function keys as in the previous hybrid, which are obtained using the FE challenger.
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Hybrid 3:








(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i ∀i /∈ I
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Algorithm GenKeys′′f ({(r′k,MSKFEk )}k∈[`]
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← MIFE.Setup(1κ)
SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
∀i ∈ [`], do:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,⊥; r′i)
Return (SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J
(αj , rj ,Kj)← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) ∀j ∈ J
y←$RY ((i1, . . . , i`), f)
If ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′) /∈ Q
J¯ ′ ← ∅
J¯ ′ ← J¯ ′ ∪ {i}
Q← Q ∪ ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′)
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2((αj , rj ,Kj)j∈J , y)





j )←$RΓ(j, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ J ,
γ
(m)
j ← PRF.Eval(Kj ,m ‖ (PPik )k∈[`] ‖ f)















Return (ρ(2)i , s)
Algorithm RΓ(i, (i1, . . . , i`, f)
If (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2)) ∈ Γ
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Else
γ(j)←$ {0, 1}rp ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
// where rp is the range of the PRF
Γ← Γ ∪ {(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))}
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Algorithm RY ((i1, . . . , i`, f)




Y ← Y ∪ {((i1, . . . , i`), f, y)}
Return y
Figure 13 Hybrid 3.
In more detail, we have a series of subhybrids, one for each i /∈ I, where in Hybrid 4, i,
the change above is made to the function key associated with the FE instance for party
i. Let Hybrid 4, 0 denote Hybrid 3 and let Hybrid |n \ I| denote Hybrid 4. We now give
the formal reduction to FE function hiding for distinguishing Hybrid 4, i − 1 and Hybrid
4, i (for ease of notation, we assume that the indices i are consecutive). The simulator B
is defined as follows. First B receives the public parameters PP from the FE challenger.
Then it receives (1κ, I, (PPj)j∈I) from the hybrid distinguisher A. Next it runs Step 2
to Step 10 on the left hand side of Figure 14 and passes (PPj)j /∈I (see Step 10) to A. It
handles encryption and key generation queries as follows. On an encryption query (i′,x0,x1)
with i′ 6= i, the query is handled the same as Oenc in Figure 14. On an encryption query
(i,x0,x1), a tag T ←$ {0, 1}κ is sampled and B makes a call to the FE encryption oracle with
message (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap := (mode := R,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥)) and returns the returned ciphertext.
Key generation queries are handled as in Okg in Figure 14 with one exception, namely
the secret keys SKFEi′ are computed as in GenKeys
′′′ except for the case i′ = i; the secret
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Hybrid 4:









(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i ∀i /∈ I
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Algorithm GenKeys′′′f ((r′k,MSKFEk )k∈[`], ctr)
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)←
MIFE.Setup(1κ)
SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
∀i ∈ [`], do:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,ctr; r′i)
Return (SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J
(αj , rj ,Kj)← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) ∀j ∈ J
y←$RY ((i1, . . . , i`), f)
If ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′) /∈ Q
J¯ ′ ← ∅
J¯ ′ ← J¯ ′ ∪ {i}
Q← Q ∪ ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′)
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2((αj , rj ,Kj)j∈J , y)





j )←$RΓ(j, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ J ,
γ
(m)
j ← PRF.Eval(Kj ,m ‖ (PPik )k∈[`] ‖ f)
If J¯ ′ = J¯ // if fully queried











s← y ⊕ S1 ⊕ S2⊕
GenKeys′′′({(γ(2)ik ,MSKFEik )}k∈[`], q)
Else
s← γ(0)i
Return (ρ(2)i , s)
Algorithm RΓ(i, (i1, . . . , i`, f)
If (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2)) ∈ Γ
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Else
γ(j)←$ {0, 1}rp ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
// where rp is the range of the PRF
Γ← Γ ∪ {(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))}
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Algorithm RY ((i1, . . . , i`, f)




Y ← Y ∪ {((i1, . . . , i`), f, y)}
Return y
Figure 14 Hybrid 4.
key SKFEi is obtained by making a call to the FE key generation oracle with functions
(ReEnci,⊥,ReEnci,ctr). If the FE challenger’s bit is 0, then B perfectly simulates Hybrid
4, i− 1 and if the FE challenger’s bit is 1, then B perfectly simulates Hybrid 4, i.
For j ∈ [Qk], we define:
Hybrid 5j,1: In this hybrid, we hardwire all the Qc MIFE CTs that are output by the jth
function query in the corresponding single input FE ciphertexts in the field Trap.CT and set
mode = T .
In more detail, for key query j, we generate the encryption keys exactly as in Figure 2.
Now, encryptor i ∈ [n] computes Qc ciphertexts as follows:
1. For k ∈ [Qc], let ri,j,k ← PRF.Eval(Kpunci , j ‖ EKi,j ‖ Ti,k)
2. For k ∈ [Qc], let ψi,j,k = MIFE.Enc(EKi,j ,xi,k; ri,j,k)
For k ∈ [Qc], encryptor i ∈ [n] sets Trap so as to program it for the jth function query as
follows:
Trap.mode = T, Trap.CT = ψi,j,k, Trap.index = j, val0 = x0,i,k, val1 = x1,i,k
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Please see Figure 15 for the complete description.
Hybrid 5j,1:









mkeys := ((EK1,j, . . . ,EKn,j),MSKj)←$MIFE.Setup(1κ)
(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i ∀i /∈ I
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Algorithm GenKeys′′′′f ((r′k,MSKFEk )k∈[`], ctr,mkeys)
If ctr = j
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← mkeys
Else
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← MIFE.Setup(1κ)
SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
∀i ∈ [`], do:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,ctr; r′i)
Return (SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
r ← PRF.Eval(Kpunci , j ‖ EKi,j ‖ T )
ψ ← MIFE.Enc(EKi,j,x0; r)
Trap← (mode := Trap,CT := ψ,
index := j, val0 := x0, val1 := x1)
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J
(αj , rj ,Kj)← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) ∀j ∈ J
y←$RY ((i1, . . . , i`), f)
If ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′) /∈ Q
J¯ ′ ← ∅
J¯ ′ ← J¯ ′ ∪ {i}
Q← Q ∪ ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′)
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2((αj , rj ,Kj)j∈J , y)





j )←$RΓ(j, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ J ,
γ
(m)
j ← PRF.Eval(Kj ,m ‖ (PPik )k∈[`] ‖ f)
If J¯ ′ = J¯ // if fully queried











s← y ⊕ S1 ⊕ S2⊕
GenKeys′′′′({(γ(2)ik ,MSKFEik )}k∈[`], q,mkeys)
Else
s← γ(0)i
Return (ρ(2)i , s)
Algorithm RΓ(i, (i1, . . . , i`, f)
If (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2)) ∈ Γ
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Else
γ(j)←$ {0, 1}rp ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
// where rp is the range of the PRF
Γ← Γ ∪ {(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))}
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Algorithm RY ((i1, . . . , i`, f)




Y ← Y ∪ {((i1, . . . , i`), f, y)}
Return y
Figure 15 Hybrid 5j,1.
Note that the hardwired ciphertext is only output for query j, the outputs for the other
queries are exactly equal to those in the previous hybrid. Now, for query j, the ciphertext
is hardwired and output is set to be equal to what was output in the previous hybrid. It
follows that the output of FE decryption remains exactly the same as in the previous hybrid.
Thus, by security of FE, we have that the two hybrids are indistinguishable.
In more detail, we have a series of subhybrids, one for each i /∈ I, where in Hybrid
5j,1, i, the change above is made to the ciphertext associated with the FE instance for party
i. Let Hybrid 5j,1, 0 denote Hybrid 4 and let Hybrid 5j,1, |n \ I| denote Hybrid 5j,1. We
now give the formal reduction to FE semantic security for distinguishing Hybrid 5j,1, i− 1
and Hybrid 5j,1, i (for ease of notation, we assume that the indices i are consecutive). The
simulator B is defined as follows. First B receives the public parameters PP from the FE
challenger. Then it receives (1κ, I, (PPj)j∈I) from the hybrid distinguisher A. Next it runs
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Step 2 to Step 11 on the left hand side of Figure 15 and passes (PPj)j /∈I (see Step 11) to
A. It handles encryption and key generation queries as follows. On an encryption query
(i′,x0,x1) with i′ 6= i, the query is handled the same as Oenc in Figure 15. On an encryption
query (i,x0,x1), a tag T ←$ {0, 1}κ is sampled, then r ← PRF.Eval(Kpunci , j ‖ EKi,j ‖ T ),
ψ ← MIFE.Enc(EKi,j ,x0; r), Trap0 ← (mode := R,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) and Trap1 ← (mode :=
Trap, ψ, j,x0,x1) are computed and B makes a call to the FE encryption oracle with messages
(x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap0) and (x0, T,K
punc
i ,Trap1), and returns the returned ciphertext. Key
generation queries are handled as in Okg in Figure 15 with one exception, namely the secret
keys SKFEi′ are computed as in GenKeys
′′′′ except for the case i′ = i; the secret key SKFEi is
obtained by making a call to the FE key generation oracle for function ReEnci,ctr. If the FE
challenger’s bit is 0, then B perfectly simulates Hybrid 5j,1, i− 1 and if the FE challenger’s
bit is 1, then B perfectly simulates Hybrid 5j,1, i.
Hybrid 5j,2: In this hybrid, we use a punctured PRF to generate the MIFE CTs in the
ReEnc functionality encoded in the FE function keys. The PRF for party i is punctured at
prefix j so that the randomness ri,j,k defined above, for i ∈ [n], k ∈ [Qc] cannot be generated.
All MIFE ciphertexts corresponding to other function queries can be generated as before.
In more detail:
1. For i ∈ [n], party i samples Kpunci,j ← puncF(Kpunci , j).
2. The ith encryptor computes FE.enc
(
MSKFE, (x0,i,k, Ti,k,Kpunci,j ,Trap)
)
where all other
fields are set as in the previous hybrid.
During FE decryption, for any query j′ 6= j, we now obtain:
ri,j′,k ← puncF(Kpunci,j , j′ ‖ EKi,j′ ‖ Ti,k)
for k ∈ [Qc]. Everything else is as in the previous hybrid. For query j, the hardwired CT is
output, and the punctured PRF key is not used to generate randomness. Please see Figure
16 for the complete description.
We have by correctness of the punctured PRF that for any j′ 6= j, all the computed ri,j′,k
are exactly equal to those computed in the previous hybrid, where the normal PRF key was
used. For query j, the PRF is not used and the hardwired value is output in both hybrids.
Hence, the outputs of FE decryption are equal in both hybrids. Thus, indistinguishability
follows from security of FE.
In more detail, we have a series of subhybrids, one for each i /∈ I, where in Hybrid 5j,2, i,
the change above is made to the ciphertext associated with the FE instance for party i. Let
Hybrid 5j,2, 0 denote Hybrid 5j,1 and let Hybrid 5j,2, |n \ I| denote Hybrid 5j,2. We now give
the formal reduction to FE semantic security for distinguishing Hybrid 5j,2, i− 1 and Hybrid
5j,2, i (for ease of notation, we assume that the indices i are consecutive). The simulator B is
defined as follows. First B receives the public parameters PP from the FE challenger. Then it
receives (1κ, I, (PPj)j∈I) from the hybrid distinguisherA. Next it runs Step 2 to Step 12 on the
left hand side of Figure 16 and passes (PPj)j /∈I (see Step 12) to A. It handles encryption and
key generation queries as follows. On an encryption query (i′,x0,x1) with i′ 6= i, the query is
handled the same as Oenc in Figure 16. On an encryption query (i,x0,x1), a tag T ←$ {0, 1}κ
is sampled, then r ← PRF.Eval(Kpunci , j ‖ EKi,j ‖ T ), ψ ← MIFE.Enc(EKi,j ,x0; r) and
Trap← (mode := Trap, ψ, j,x0,x1) are computed and B makes a call to the FE encryption
oracle with messages (x0, T,Kpunci ,Trap) and (x0, T,K
punc
i,j ,Trap), and returns the returned
ciphertext. Note that the punctured key Kpunci,j is derived in Step 4 on the left hand side of
Figure 16. Key generation queries are handled as in Okg in Figure 15 with one exception,
namely the secret keys SKFEi′ are computed as in GenKeys
′′′′ except for the case i′ = i; the
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Hybrid 5j,2:










mkeys := ((EK1,j, . . . ,EKn,j),MSKj)
←$MIFE.Setup(1κ)
(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i ∀i /∈ I
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Algorithm GenKeys′′′′f ((r′k,MSKFEk )k∈[`], ctr,mkeys)
If ctr = j
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← mkeys
Else
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← MIFE.Setup(1κ)
SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
∀i ∈ [`], do:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,ctr; r′i)
Return (SKf , SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
r ← PRF.Eval(Kpunci , j ‖ EKi,j ‖ T )
ψ ← MIFE.Enc(EKi,j,x0; r)
Trap← (mode := Trap,CT := ψ,
index := j, val0 := x0, val1 := x1)
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci,j ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J
(αj , rj ,Kj)← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) ∀j ∈ J
y←$RY ((i1, . . . , i`), f)
If ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′) /∈ Q
J¯ ′ ← ∅
J¯ ′ ← J¯ ′ ∪ {i}
Q← Q ∪ ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′)
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2((αj , rj ,Kj)j∈J , y)





j )←$RΓ(j, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ J ,
γ
(m)
j ← PRF.Eval(Kj ,m ‖ (PPik )k∈[`] ‖ f)
If J¯ ′ = J¯ // if fully queried











s← y ⊕ S1 ⊕ S2⊕
GenKeys′′′′({(γ(2)ik ,MSKFEik )}k∈[`], q,mkeys)
Else
s← γ(0)i
Return (ρ(2)i , s)
Algorithm RΓ(i, (i1, . . . , i`, f)
If (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2)) ∈ Γ
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Else
γ(j)←$ {0, 1}rp ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
// where rp is the range of the PRF
Γ← Γ ∪ {(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))}
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Algorithm RY ((i1, . . . , i`, f)




Y ← Y ∪ {((i1, . . . , i`), f, y)}
Return y
Figure 16 Hybrid 5j,2.
secret key SKFEi is obtained by making a call to the FE key generation oracle for function
ReEnci,ctr. If the FE challenger’s bit is 0, then B perfectly simulates Hybrid 5j,2, i− 1 and if
the FE challenger’s bit is 1, then B perfectly simulates Hybrid 5j,2, i.
Hybrid 5j,3: In this hybrid, we switch the randomness used in the hardwired MIFE CT to be
true randomness. That is, ri,j,k is sampled uniformly at random for i ∈ [n], k ∈ [Qc]. We have
by the security of the punctured PRF that given the punctured key, the PRF evaluations at
the punctured points are indistinguishable from random. Hence, indistinguishability follows
from security of punctured PRF.
Please see Figure 17 for the detailed description.
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Hybrid 5j,3:










mkeys := ((EK1,j, . . . ,EKn,j),MSKj)←$MIFE.Setup(1κ)
(ρ(1)i )i/∈I ←$ S˜im1()
PPi ← ρ(1)i ∀i /∈ I
st←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)1 (st)
b′←$AOenc(·,·,·),Okg(·,·,·)2 ((PPi)i/∈I , st)
Return (b = b′)
Algorithm GenKeys′′′′f ((r′k,MSKFEk )k∈[`], ctr,mkeys)
If ctr = j
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← mkeys
Else
((EK1, . . . ,EK`),MSK)← MIFE.Setup(1κ)
SKf ← MIFE.KeyGen(MSK, f)
∀i ∈ [`], do:
SKFEi ← FE.KeyGen(MSKFEi ,ReEncEKi,ctr; r′i)
Return (SKf ,SKFE1 , . . . , SKFE`)
Oracle Oenc(i,x0,x1)
T ←$ {0, 1}κ
r←$ {0, 1}rp
// where rp is the range of the PRF
ψ ← MIFE.Enc(EKi,j,x0; r)
Trap← (mode := Trap,CT := ψ, index := j,
val0 := x0, val1 := x1)
Return FE.Enc(MSKFEi , (x0, T,Kpunci,j ,Trap))
Oracle Okg(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
J ← I ∩ {i1, . . . , i`}; J¯ ← {i1, . . . , i`} \ J
(αj , rj ,Kj)← E˜xtract(ρ(1)j ) ∀j ∈ J
y←$RY ((i1, . . . , i`), f)
If ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′) /∈ Q
J¯ ′ ← ∅
J¯ ′ ← J¯ ′ ∪ {i}
Q← Q ∪ ((i1, . . . , i`), f, J¯ ′)
(ρ(2)j )j∈J¯ ←$ S˜im2((αj , rj ,Kj)j∈J , y)





j )←$RΓ(j, (i1, . . . , i`), f)
∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ J ,
γ
(m)
j ← PRF.Eval(Kj ,m ‖ (PPik )k∈[`] ‖ f)
If J¯ ′ = J¯ // if fully queried











s← y ⊕ S1 ⊕ S2⊕
GenKeys′′′′({(γ(2)ik ,MSKFEik )}k∈[`], q,mkeys)
Else
s← γ(0)i
Return (ρ(2)i , s)
Algorithm RΓ(i, (i1, . . . , i`, f)
If (i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2)) ∈ Γ
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Else
γ(j)←$ {0, 1}rp ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
// where rp is the range of the PRF
Γ← Γ ∪ {(i, (i1, . . . , i`), f, γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))}
Return (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2))
Algorithm RY ((i1, . . . , i`, f)




Y ← Y ∪ {((i1, . . . , i`), f, y)}
Return y
Figure 17 Hybrid 5j,3.
In more detail, we have a series of subhybrids, one for each i /∈ I, where in Hybrid 5j,3, i,
the change above is made to the function key associated with the FE instance for party i.
Let Hybrid 5j,3, 0 denote Hybrid 5j,2 and let Hybrid 5j,3, |n \ I| denote Hybrid 5j,3. We now
give the formal reduction to PRF security for distinguishing Hybrid 5j,3, i− 1 and Hybrid
5j,3, i (for ease of notation, we assume that the indices i are consecutive). The simulator B is
defined as follows. First B receives (1κ, I, (PPj)j∈I) from the hybrid distinguisher A. Next it
runs
For all i′ /∈ I, i′ 6= i:
Kpunci′ ←$Kκ
Kpunci′,j ← PRF.Punc(Kpunci′ , j)
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Then it sends a challenge prefix j to the PRF challenger and receives a punctured key; call
this Kpunci,j . Next B runs Step 5 to Step 12 on the left hand side of Figure 17 and passes
(PPj)j /∈I (see Step 12) to A. It handles encryption and key generation queries as follows. Key
generation queries are handled as in Okg in Figure 17. On an encryption query (i′,x0,x1)
with i′ 6= i, the query is handled the same as Oenc in Figure 17. On an encryption query
(i,x0,x1), the query is handled the same as Oenc in Figure 17 except Step 2 of Oenc where r
is computed. To obtain r, the PRF evaluation oracle is queried at the point j ‖ EKi,j ‖ T
where T is derived in Step 1 of Oenc. Now if the PRF challenger’s bit is 0, the string r will be
computed using the PRF and B perfectly simulates 5j,3, i− 1. On the other hand, if the PRF
challenger’s bit is 1, the string r will be uniformly random because the queried evaluation
point begins with the challenge prefix j (i.e. the PRF is punctured at that point) and so B
perfectly simulates Hybrid 5j,3, i.
Hybrid 5j,4: In this Hybrid, the protocol GenKeys′′′′ is modified further so that for key
j, MIFE.Setup or MIFE.KeyGen are not invoked. Rather, the output of the MIFE.KeyGen
algorithm is hardwired and output for key j. The hardwired value is exactly the same as in
the previous hybrid, hence indistinguishability holds by security of MPC. In more detail, the
MPC simulator receives identical inputs in both hybrids and hence produces indistinguishable
outputs in the two hybrids.
Hybrid 5j,5: In this hybrid, we switch the hardwired MIFE CTs within the FE CTs to use
bit b = 1. Indistinguishability follows from MIFE security. In more detail, we fix query j.
For party i ∈ [n] and ciphertext query k ∈ [Qc], we construct a reduction which plays against
the MIFE challenger as below. The reduction computes everything as in the previous hybrid
except that the hardwired ciphertexts for the jth copy of MIFE, which it receives from the
MIFE challenger as below:
1. The reduction requests for MIFE key corresponding to function fj which it receives. It
hardwires this into functionality GenKeys.
2. For i ∈ [n], k ∈ [Qc], the challenge ciphertexts for party i are set as (x0,i,k, Ti,k,Kpunci,j )
and (x1,i,k, Ti,k,Kpunci,j ).
3. The reduction receives ψi,j,k for i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [Qc]. It hardwires these into the FE
ciphertexts as discussed above.
It is evident that if b = 0 then we are in Hybrid 5j,4 and if b = 1 we are in Hybrid 5j,5. Thus,
an adversary that distinguishes between these two hybrids can be used to break the security
of the jth MIFE scheme.
Now that the bit b has been switched for query j, we roll back our changes. Arguments
of indistinguishability are analogous to the above and are skipped.
Hybrid 5j,6: Change GenKeys′′ to invoke MIFE.Setup and MIFE.KeyGen as before.
Hybrid 5j,7: Switch randomness in the hardwired CT back to PRF randomness.
Hybrid 5j,8: Switch punctured PRF key back to normal PRF key.
Hybrid 5j,9: Increment Trap.index by 1. At this point, for key j, we have ctrj < Trapindex,
hence by the design of the ReEnc algorithm, we have that the bit b = 1 is used for MIFE
encryption. This is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid by security of FE because
decryption values are exactly the same in both the hybrids.
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Hybrid 5j+1,1: This Hybrid is analogous to Hybrid 5j,1. Indistinguishability follows by
security of FE as discussed above. Finally, in Hybrid 5Qk,9, all the keys are outputting MIFE
CTs corresponding to b = 1.
Hybrid 6: In this hybrid, use message corresponding to b = 1 and mode = R. Again,
indistinguishability follows by security of FE since the outputs are the same.
Hybrid 7: Undo the changes made in Hybrid 4, namely the algorithm GenKeys′′ invoked
for query index j for all j ∈ [Qk] is modified to invoke ReEnc with parameter ctr = ⊥.
Indistinguishability follows analogously to the transition between Hybrid 3 and Hybrid 4.
Hybrid 8: Undo the changes made in Hybrid 3. Specifically, we generate y (the target
output passed to S˜im2) and s (the masking value component of the partial decryption key) the
same as in Hybrid 2 for each query ((i1, . . . , i`), f). Indistinguishability follows analogously
to the transition between Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3.
Hybrid 9: Undo the changes made in Hybrid 2. More precisely, we replace the uniformly
random strings used in the function GenKeys for the honest users i with the outputs of
the PRF. Indistinguishability follows analogously to the transition between Hybrid 1 and
Hybrid 2.
Hybrid 10: Undo the changes made in Hybrid 1, that is, we generate the first-round protocol
messages ρ(1)i (in the public parameters) and second-round protocol messages ρ
(2)
i (in the
partial decryption keys) for MPC as in the real system for each uncorrupted user i /∈ I.
Indistinguishability follows analogously to the transition between Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1.
Hybrid 10 is the real world with bit b = 1. J
E Proof of Security for Ad Hoc MIFE for Inner Products
In this section, we provide the proof of security for our ad hoc MIFE for inner products.
I Theorem 10. If the MIFE constructed by [2] is a xxx-IND-secure MIFE scheme and MPC
is an xxx-SIM-secure 2-round MPC protocol, then our construction is sel-IND-secure.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the proof of theorem 5. For simplicity, we describe the
proof for the case of a single key query. The case of multiple queries is handled exactly as in
the proof of theorem 5. In more detail, we define:
Hybrid 0: This is the real game in which on every encryption query (i,x0,x1), x0 is
encrypted.
Hybrid 1: Exactly as in the proof of theorem 5, the MPC transcript in this hybrid is
simulated. Indistinguishability follows as in the proof of theorem 5.
Hybrid 2: In this hybrid, we switch the bit in the MIFE ciphertexts to 1. Indistinguishability
follows via a reduction, in which the MIFE function key and ciphertexts are obtained from
the MIFE challenger. The MIFE function key is input to the MPC simulator and the MPC
transcript and MIFE ciphertexts are returned to the adversary.
To support multiple keys, we proceed as in the proof of theorem 5 and change the bit
used in the MIFE encryption from 0 to 1 key by key. J
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